Introduction

The South American country of Colombia is considered to be Latin America’s most stable democracy, yet it has been continually plagued by violence, insurrection and inequality. The government has, thus far, been unable to gain control over certain regions of the country, leaving landowners’ private armies as the sole source of protection and control in these areas. This, combined with the growing popularity of guerilla organizations, namely the Armed Forces of the Colombian Revolution (FARC) and the Army of National Liberation (ELN), has created a hotbed for instability in Colombia. Furthermore, since the 1970′s drug trafficking has become increasingly current in sure regions of the country and has been employed as a means of survival for peasant farmers. The lucrative drug trade in Colombia has increased the instability by financing paramilitary and guerrilla organizations, making the country one of the world leaders in non-political homicides and kidnapping.

To date, the Colombian government’s battle against these challenges has been unsuccessful. Despite any efforts to counter the guerrilla groups and combat the drug trade, both have grown in popularity over the past few decades. It is both Colombia’s history and current policies that make up the formula for the tumult in the country. These troubles are firmly rooted in Colombia’s past of violence and its political culture. It seems as if there is no solution for the instability in this otherwise stable democracy. Despite the fact that Colombia is home to one Latin America’s oldest democracies, its new civil and political situation is one that has the potential to bring Colombia’s stable democracy to its knees. A policy change is possible; however, it seems unlikely that a policy change could counter the resolve of the Colombian rebels or bring an end to the conflicts that are threatening its stability. Although many political scientists argue that Colombia has one of Latin America’s most stable democracies, it has become clear that this democracy is being threatened by the instability within the country’s borders. The question is whether the Colombian government and its people will be able to overcome these current challenges and become a truly stable democracy.

Precursors to Colombia’s Troubles

Geography

Colombia is located in the northwest corner of South America and shares borders with Panáma, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil. Its capital city of Bogotá is in the center of the country. Other major cities include Cali, Cartagena and Medellin. Colombia is about 440,000 square miles in area and is dominated almost completely by the Andes Mountains. Other terrain include flat coastal areas, with coastlines on two bodies of water, the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, central highlands and grasslands in the eastern part of the country (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2006). Colombian residents enjoy a tropical climate along the coastline and in the eastern plains and a slightly cooler climate in the highlands. These different topographies and climates have created a unique situation that allows Colombia’s farmers to cultivate a variety of illegal narcotics. “Coca is cultivated and processed in the lowlands of the Orinoco and Amazon, marijuana cultivation is concentrated on the Atlantic coast, and the opium poppy is grown high in the Andes” (Kline and Gray 2007, 202). In this sense, even Colombia’s geography contributes to its current troubles. The terrain allows for the cultivation of a variety of drugs, while the climate produces a perfect situation for cultivation.

Demographics

Although Spanish is the common language in Colombia, some native tribal languages are still spoken in certain regions. As a previous Spanish colony, ninety percent of Colombia’s 46 million people are Roman Catholic, while the remaining ten percent is made up of Protestant Christians, Jews and Muslims. Colombia is also home to a broad mix of ethnic groups, the majority being mestizo, a mix of European and Native American ancestry. Other ethnicities that are demonstrate in Colombia are Caucasian, mulatto, and dismal with slight percentages of mixed Amerindians (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2006). It is well-known to note that the different peoples that populate Colombia have very different cultures and have arranged themselves geographically to form different societies. Those of European origin settled mostly in the highlands; descendants of slaves have settled mostly in the coastal plains; and those of the original Indian culture have settled mostly in the forested regions (Kissinger 2001, 89). This innate societal separation, based on regional economic and cultural differences and caused by the heterogeneous nature of Colombian society, is one of the main causes of the endemic violence in the country. This tradition of regionalism and isolationism has lent itself to a violent tradition that now stands between Colombia and a truly stable political system.

An necessary part of Colombia’s demographic situation and part of the cause of Colombia’s heterogeneity is its tradition of a highly stratified society.

According to political scientists Harvey F. Kline and Vanessa Gray:

A division exists between those engaged in manual labor and those who are not. Among nonmanual groups, further stratification is based on wealth, hasten, and abolengonuevos ricos (drug dealers, for example), who have great wealth but no pedigree. Colombia’s egregious disparities of income, living standards, and access to health care and education mean that for the average person, life is difficult and the prospects for betterment are slim. It cannot be overemphasized that Colombia consistently ranks among the three countries worldwide with the worst inequality” (Kline and Gray 2007, 203-204).

It is this glaring disparity between classes which leaves nearly fifty percent of its people to live below the poverty level (CIA 2007, Colombia/Economy). What is more significant is that it is this poverty that makes the lowest class the most vulnerable to the demands of drug traffickers, guerrilla and paramilitary groups that profit from the drug trade. Colombia’s highly stratified society increases the potential for instability. This stratification, coupled with regionalism and the increasing drug trade are a recipe for crisis.

Displaced Persons

Another important content involving Colombians is an unusually high number of internal refugees. The refugees from both the conflict between the government and FARC and the ongoing drug wars are numbered at 3.1 million, which is nearly seven percent of Colombia’s population (CIA 2007, Colombia/International Issues). Although Colombia’s rural population has been suffering from the internal warfare and has been forced to displace for the past forty years, it has only been since the early 1990s that this issue has become a cause for national concern. This increased concern is because the site from which Colombian citizens have been forced to flee has been expanded significantly. At the beginning of the conflicts, these areas had been limited to a few remote areas of new agricultural land. Currently, the rural population is being expelled from the richest and most productive farmland or being forced to grow drugs instead of subsistence crops. Citizens are also being forced to leave behind homes that are located on both coastlines, as the different armed forces wage warfare against one another for control over the strategically and lucratively placed properties (Fagen et. al. 2006, 73).

Since the mid-nineties the number and frequency of these displacements have increased exponentially, a fact that has triggered an alarm in the government and among human rights groups. This increase is indicative of the escalation and expansion of the area controlled by an armed party which opposes the government. As the rural displaced populations flood the cities to flee the violence in the countryside, the conditions of the urban environment deteriorate. The cities and their resources are unable to accommodate the number of refugees, so most of these displaced persons are without insurance, welfare assistance, health care or education services (Fagen et. al. 2006, 73).

Iberian Political Culture

The Spanish conquest of Central and South America created within Latin America a certain Iberian culture. The Iberian culture has greatly impacted the political culture and systems of Latin America. It has created within Spanish-speaking countries a fatalistic society with a permanent underclass of native Americans. This Iberian political culture has set into a place a society which places much importance on class and race. The Iberian political culture has also created a mixture of European and native American culture in Latin America (Porter 2006).

This is true for Colombia as well. The basis for Colombia’s economy and social culture comes from its connection to the Iberian Peninsula. In their collaborative work, Politics of Latin America, Harry Vanden and Gary Prevost place “as a Spanish colonial possession, Colombia’s economic significance was primarily as a producer of gold for the mother country” (2007, 498). Also, the port at Cartagena was important for the Spanish navy in Caribbean relations as well as for the slave trade and other European imports.

The Iberian influence also has social significance in Colombia. The Iberians affected both the political culture and the political development of Latin America. This Iberian culture has left late a number of influences and traditions including a caudillo tradition. According to Peter Smith, a prominent Latin American political scientist, “governments were run and overrun by caudillos, soldiers (or ex-soldiers) often with paramilitary followings that took power by force and ransacked national treasuries. Once the coffers were empty, their bands dispersed and rival caudillos took over” (Smith 2005, 20). Although this caudillo tradition is one shared by many Latin American countries, it is Colombia that is suffering most from it. The caudillo tradition in Colombia has lent itself to the creation of the current paramilitary groups that are slowly taking over power in the frontier regions of the country.

History

The only South American Country with coastlines on the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, Colombia was founded along with Ecuador and Venezuela in 1830 after the collapse of Gran Colombia, which included the countries of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2006). Colombia’s history is one of revolution and unrest, which continued after Colombia became an independent nation. Vice President Francisco de Paula Santander, founded the Liberal Party in the early 1830′s. The Liberal Party took control in 1849 and reigned nearly continuously until 1880. During the period of Liberal dominance, the Roman Catholic Church was disestablished which led to extreme unrest and civil war, when President Rafael Nuñez restored the power of the central government and the church (Hylton 2006). The Republic of Colombia was officially established in 1855, four years after the abolition of slavery. Over the next 100 years, Colombian politics were polluted by the feud between the Conservative and Liberal parties, which is responsible for many outbreaks of war. Periods of democratic government alternated with that of brutal dictatorships, as the two parties battled for control and power (Hylton 2006).

It was not irregular for violent outbursts to erupt in Colombia in the first half of the twentieth century. The summer of 1929 was host to several violent outbursts of its own. One of the outbreaks involved a government attempt to silence demonstrations in the streets of Bogotá, which led to the death of a student. Another took location a moth later, this time as a horribly organized insurrection which occurred simultaneously in different cities all over the country (Oquist 2980, 84).

The next major shift in Colombian history occurred in July of 1957 when the National Front was founded through a coalition between Conservative and Liberal parties. The National Front itself eventually began to be seen as a form of political repression, especially after the deceptive election of Misael Pastrana Borrero. A large group of Colombian citizens who felt that the election of Borrero was illegitimate and unethical formed a current group of insurrectionists. For the next twenty years, Colombia would suffer insurgencies led by the 19^th of April Movement or the M-19, which was founded in response to Borrero’s election (Hylton 2006). in 1970

By the mid-1990′s, the country was in the midst of a struggle between the government, drug traffickers, right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing guerrillas. The United States government has save increasing pressure on the Colombians to prosecute the War on Drugs, because Colombia is the United States’ number one supplier of cocaine, heroin and marijuana (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2006).

When right-winger Alvaro Uribe took office as president in 2002, he immediately declared a state of emergency due to attacks by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) on Colombian cities (Hylton 2006). Scholars say that his election was a reflection of the feelings of the Colombian populace, a people who had grown frustrated and disillusioned because of the ongoing violence and unrest. Critical of the previous administration under Pastrana, Uribe promised the Colombian people that he would restore situation authority throughout the country. “Although this stance was appealing for many in the war-weary population, it carried with it the risk of increasing direct and indirect state violations of human rights” (Vanden and Prevost 2006, 517). He began working with the United States government under George W. Bush during his first two years in office. Since 2004, Uribe, with the help of the United States, has made progress in both the “War on Drugs” and in gaining control of the guerilla and paramilitary forces which terrorize the country (Vanden and Prevost 2006, 517). Despite this progress, however, the guerrilla and paramilitary forces still have control over a gargantuan portion of the country.

Beginning with the Spanish conquest, Colombia’s history has been one of violence and struggle. Its history has created the roots for the current violence and instability within the country. It is a history that is inordinately violent and thus, uniquely Colombian.

Political Development

Colombia’s history of revolution and upheaval is the basic story of its political development. It has followed a cyclical pattern to democracy and is basically unexcited in a transitional residence because of its ongoing insurrections. Colombia joined the family of democracies in 1942 during the second cycle of Latin American democratization. It was part of the group of nations whose democracy began during or directly after World War II (Smith 2005, 28). Although it has had a stable democracy with civilian leaders and periodic elections for more than fifty years, Colombia has a history of revolution and a pattern of wavering between democracy and autocracy (Kissinger 2001, 89). Colombia’s government has alternated between democracy and dictatorship due to both unyielding political unrest and a constant power struggle between the two dominant parties, the Liberal and Conservative Parties (Hylton 2006).

It is quite determined that Colombia has followed a cyclical pattern of political development, in an ongoing and difficult bolt toward a stable democracy. “Although a formal constitutional democracy with an extensive history of civilian rule, Colombia’s political regime has often been restrictive in character and has frequently failed to provide effective guarantees of basic civil rights and liberties to its citizens” (Vanden and Prevost 2006, 497). The absence of civil rights and liberties has both led to and assisted in the creation and maintenance of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups that have wreaked havoc on Colombia’s stability.

Economy

Colombia has a free market economy with strong commercial and investment ties to the United States. Colombia has been in transition from a strictly regulated economy for nearly 15 years (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2006). Although Colombia is suffering a serious and violent insurgency, its economy has recently been on a trend of recovery. The economy is improving because of President Uribe’s reform policies of strict government budgets and a reduction of public debt. Uribe still needs to focus on reforming the pension system and reducing high unemployment rates, but Uribe has done a commendable job in boosting Colombia’s economy. Recently the Colombian coffee industry experienced a train and is recovering from pervious lows by pursuing economic relations with developed countries (CIA 2007, Colombia/Economy).

It is this system however that has become a catalyst for an increase in guerrilla and paramilitary activity. The guerrilla and paramilitary groups have been able to draw from a new pool of people, such as small farmers and laborers, who have been negatively effected by this new economy (Aviles 2006, 23). This new, more capitalistic system is also another field through which the United States is connected to Colombia, something that fuels the flames of those angry with the Colombian government.

Political Parties

Colombia’s government is run basically on a two-party system. There are two dominant parties: the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, though the Independent Democratic Pole also recently reaching the status of a main party. Typically however, members of the Liberal and Conservative Parties are elected to governmental positions.

The Colombian Liberal Party (PL) is the social-democratic party. The party holds the majority of the Senate and is generally opposed to President Uribe’s policies, despite a small fraction of PL members, mainly elected Liberal congressmen, who support him. The Liberal Party is a member of Socialist International, an international organization. for social democratic and democratic socialistparties (Kline and Gray 2007, 213)

The Colombian Conservative Party has been in existence since 1849. The Conservative Party’s goals are to bring Colombia peace from insurgencies, to bring about national unity and reinforce the importance of the Roman Catholic faith, to reform the 1991 Constitution, to modernize the country and to bring civil rights and prosperity to the Colombian people. The Conservative Party also stands in full succor of President Uribe, a former member of the Liberal Party (Kline and Gray 2007, 213).

The Independent Democratic Pole (PDI) is a left-wing, social-democratic party which was founded in 2003. The PDI’s main purposes are to support the negotiations between the government and the insurgents, defending the 1991 Constitution which is vehemently opposed by the Conservative Party and attempting to extinguish the two-party system in Colombia. Although it has received fierce opposition from the Conservative Party, which has even resulted in the murder of some of its members, the PDI has recently gained success as one of its candidates, Luis Eduardo Garzon was elected in 2003 as Bogotá’s mayor (Kline and Gray 2007, 213).

“The dominant political forces in Colombia and homes to the country’s economic elites are …the Liberal and Conservative parties…Colombia’s political structures, however, have changed little since the middle of the nineteenth century….Nevertheless, Colombia’s past has been very violent” (Schulte-Bockholt 2006, 100). The political parties have basically been fighting an unofficial civil war since the middle of the nineteenth century. The reason that these groups have become violent is because both parties created mass followings of people, who settled in a geographic status which was supportive of his or her party. A persons locale “implied acceptance of his or her political credo as well as recruitment into the respective party militias who fought the civil wars” (Schulte-Bockholt 2006, 100).

It is necessary to note that historically there has been a constant power struggle between the two dominant parties, the Liberal and Conservative Parties, which only give more legitimacy to the opinion that Colombia’s past of violence and unrest is something that will continue to plague its stability far into the future. Colombia‘s Troubles: Insurrection

Despite its façade of democratic stability Colombia is currently facing two well-established leftist guerrilla movements, a brutal right-wing paramilitary movement, an increasingly violent drug traffic and millions of internally displaced refugees fleeing from the violence and upheaval in the countryside (Vanden and Prevost 2006, 497). “Three types of illegitimate actors challenge the Colombian political system…. The guerrillas call for a redistribution of power and resources away from foreign interests and national ‘oligarchs’ to the unpleasant, the drug traffickers seek to compose and trade their illicit goods with impunity, and the paramilitaries claim to be defending society from guerrillas and from the opponents of economic progress” (Kline and Gary 2007, 219). These groups are not only responsible for countless violent and fatal acts but also the perpetuation of the drug trade, which is used to fund their terrorist activities. These groups also recruit young children, receive millions of dollars of funding from the drug trade and use Colombia’s dense and rugged frontier land to its advantage (Kline and Gary 2007, 220).

On top of Colombia’s three primary troubles, the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and the drug traffickers, the Colombian government’s ties with the United States government has caused its own series of troubles. It has also increased the intensity of resistance from the pre-established groups of insurrectionists. It is these troubles that threaten the stability of Colombia’s otherwise stable democracy. For one to understand the depth of these problems, one must take a closer look into the workings of each one of these factors.

The Guerilla Groups

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

Of the two indispensable guerrilla groups in Colombia the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is the largest. “The FARC, the largest, most militant, best-armed, and best-trained guerrilla group, had roughly twenty thousand active combatants in 2003…. FARC strongholds have tended to be frontier regions neglected by the national government and plagued by general lawlessness. The FARC has acted as a de facto site in such areas and also serves as a gendarme for squatters and peasants growing illicit crops” (Kline and Gary 2007, 220). The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is active throughout the nation. Its headquarters is in the southern area of the country where it governed a broad region for over forty years. The mission of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is to overthrow the novel government and establish an agricultural, Communist station. The FARC mainly finances its terrorist operations through kidnapping and ransom, extortion, and narcotics trafficking (Harper 2003).

Although FARC lost a lot of support in the early 1990′s due to the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent loss of funding, the group continued to gain both territory and combatants throughout the following decade. When the Soviet Union fell and the financing for FARC slowed, the group turned to drug money and kidnapping in order to finance its operations. Paramilitary groups and the Colombian army, which is supported by the United States, have assign increased pressure on FARC. Because of this newly intensified pressure, FARC has turned toward actions that harm citizens such as using landmines, bombs and airplane hijacking. (Kline and Gary 2007, 220-221).

Because the FARC is now harming innocent civilians in order to approach its goals, it has become increasingly significant to bring an demolish to its rule in these frontier areas. Despite this fact, the Uribe administration has been unable to gain control over the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and has even gone as far as to relinquish control of certain areas to the group (Kissinger 2001, 90).

This is not to say that the government has not made attempts to squash FARC. In 1984 FARC created a political party, the Union Patriotica (UP), as portion of an agreement with the government which would permit leftist electoral competition. The government used this party as a means to accomplish several thousands of the party’s members. These attacks by a combination of paramilitaries, site security forces and right fly execution squads basically destroyed the party (Aviles 2006, 22). Despite the fact that the government had pooled its resources and successfully squashed the Revolutionary Armed Forces’ political party (albeit through violence), the efforts were unable to make an affect on the guerilla organization itself.

Furthermore, the government’s transition into a more capitalistic system has seemed to have helped the FARC. This new system has created in increase in both the rural unemployed as well as the informal labor pool, which increases the number of possible recruits as these groups of people become restless. Some of these rural unemployed have survived by growing coca, therefore increasing the revenue that FARC collects through taxing the drug traffic (Aviles 2006, 22).

Although the government has made a number of efforts to squash the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, its transitioning market and its policy of appeasing this group have only helped to increase the sources from which this party gains its members. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Union Patriotica increased the likelihood of violence because of the lack of more peaceful options. The government’s use of force and violence has done itsy-bitsy more than incite further violent acts.

The National Liberation Army

“Inspired by the Cuban Revolution and supported by Havana, the ELN is another rural Marxist insurgency formed in the 1960′s. It is the second largest guerrilla group in Colombia today but its membership has fallen since the late1990′s from 5,000 to about 3,500″ (Kline and Gary 2007, 221). It is listed on the European Union’s list of terrorist groups. In 1963, students, Catholic radicals, and left-wing intellectuals founded the ELN as a duplication of Fidel Castro’s communist revolution in Cuba. The ELN is based in northeastern Colombia and is known for kidnapping wealthy Colombians for ransom and using bombing campaigns and extortion against large oil companies. The ELN claims to be working for the common man, to end United State’s involvement in Colombia and to privatize natural resources (Council on Foreign Relations 2004).

One factor that sets the ELN apart from the FARC is its ties with the Catholic Church. Since the mid 1960s recruits have been drawn from the Catholic Church, the most notable: a Colombian priest Camilo Torres, who fought as a guerrilla for only one year but was hailed as a hero and as a martyr. This religious aspect of the ELN has been the cause of much zeal and enthusiasm from those recruits drawn from the Catholic church (Kirk 2003, 58).

In 1995 this organization made an attempt on the Uribe family, just less than two years after the assassination of Alberto Uribe by FARC forces. ELN forces burned the small town of Guacharacas to the ground along with the town foreman; the town had been the location of one of the Uribe family ranches (Kirk 2003, 281).

This organization is also “known for sabotaging the pipeline carrying most of Colombia’s export petroleum. The hundreds of pipeline bombings the ELN has carried out have damaged the national economy, devastated local ecosystems and incinerated at least one village” (Kline and Gary 2007, 222). Like the FARC, the National Liberation Army has turned to tactics that have victimized innocent citizens, which is a cause for fear. According to Luis Alberto Restrepo, an expert on Colombia’s history of violence, “the principal victims of the persecution [of the ELN's eco-terrorists] are not the guerrillas themselves, however, but rather legal favorite organizations and their activists, democratic leaders, independent thought, and culture-that is, the victims are all of the social and political forces that attempt to transcend the closed bipartisan scheme left by the National Front” (1992, 275).

Paramilitaries

As the military strength of the Colombian government has increased, so has the number of paramilitaries that have spread across powerful of the northern part of the country. These paramilitary groups have been recruiting members from the “same populations as the FARC and have also effectively taxed the drug trade in their war against the insurgency. By 2001 paramilitary groups had a presence in 40 percent of the country’s municipalities and held de facto control over much of the northern share of the country” (Aviles 2006, 23).

These paramilitary groups are sometimes referred to as “self-defense groups,” or “death squads.” The first of these groups were created during colonization when nobility would hire a private militia to “protect and come their interests in areas where government forces were weak or absent” (Kline and Gray 2007, 224). These types of groups have been around since the beginning of Colombia’s history and have also been sanctioned by the government in the not-so-distant past. In 1964 the Colombian government created a law that gave legitimacy to “armed civil self-defense units as a counterinsurgency policy. In 1989 these government-sponsored private militias were declared unconstitutional. Despite the change in the law, however, evidence periodically surfaces of ongoing collusion between paramilitary groups and specific military brigades” (Kline and Gray 2007, 224). The fact that this change in law has been ineffective is mostly because the government does not put forth as much effort toward fighting the paramilitaries as it does toward the fight against guerrilla groups.

Despite the current law that revoked the legitimacy of the paramilitary forces as a method of defense in 1989, the 1990′s brought a wave of paramilitary activity and new member recruits. According to Patricia Weiss Fagen,

the irregular forces fighting today, however, derive as much or more from the private armies created by the drug cartels in the 1980s to confront the guerrilla forces threatening their land. The national army around the same time, organized the anti-guerrilla paramilitary forces. The two forces united and grew from decentralized armed mercenaries into what are collectively known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia” (2007, 76-77).

Although these groups are no longer legal, they have been continually gaining power in the conflict areas. They have gained remarkable more power, in fact, than the national military. Despite the fact that these groups have been more effective than the military against fighting the guerrillas, they have resorted to tactics that violate the human rights of innocent civilians who they deem to be subversive (Fagen et. all 2007, 77). The members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or the AUC, “employ terror tactics such as arriving in a town with a list of names, torturing and murdering certain residents in the public square, then making ominous warnings before departing” (Kline and Gray 225). Although the paramilitaries are responsible for more civilian deaths than guerrilla forces, it is crimes of the paramilitaries that are often overlooked because the government has devoted more of its resources to putting a stop to the guerrillas.

Since 2000, the conflicts between the AUC and the guerrilla groups have increased, in the same way that the battles between the army squads trained by the U.S. military and the guerrilla forces have increased. Despite the increased efforts on all sides, the violence has only increased, mainly due to the lack of diplomatic efforts. Each side, including the governmental forces, has thus far only acted with military force and have only been witness to an increase of violence and fatalities.

Drug Traffickers

Colombia’s most important issue is the drug trade. The country is currently plagued by a “deeply entrenched drug trade based upon the cultivation and processing of coca and opium poppies, and intense pressure from the United States to stop the drug trade at the source” (Vanden and Prevost 2006, 497). In the 1980s and 1990s there were three primary competing groups of drug traffickers: the Medellin cartel, the Cali cartel, and the Atlantic Flit cartel. Today there are dozens of trafficking organizations. Colombia produces some of the world’s largest supplies of coca, opium, and cannabis. It is the world’s leading cultivator of coca, which accounts for nearly 90% of the cocaine that reaches the United States. It also harvests crops that construct massive quantities of heroin and marijuana.

Currently, Colombia is working together with the United States and other nations for the “War on Drugs.” The Colombian government has been given billions of dollars since the mid-1990s to kill the coca crop and invest in other legitimate agricultural crops. The drug traffic is also a concern because it supports terrorism in Colombia and abroad and has led to the kidnapping and extortion of United States citizens, threatening both security and economic interests (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 2006).

Drug traffickers have gained a considerable amount of power in Colombian society. Recently the power of the drug traffic has been made evident through the use of brutal violence. The number of groups as well as the scope of influence of these drug traffickers has increased significantly over the years. “Abundant evidence exists documenting the investment of drug earnings into legitimate businesses in Colombia (including a professional soccer team), politics, the military, and the police forces. Drug traffickers have used bribes and intimidation to defective individual Colombians of every inappropriate” (Kline and Gray 2007, 222). Although much of the focus has been placed on the influence over the awful dirt farmers, it cannot be ignored that their influence has spread over even the highest ranking of officials.

To bring an end to the drug problems in Colombia, the government must seek assistance from both the United States and its neighboring countries. However, many countries are unwilling to benefit if the United States is involved simply because the United States has failed in the War on Drugs domestically. Kissinger, however, asserts that that the reality is:

that the finish of the drug culture is even more corrosive in Latin America than in the Untied States. In highly centralized systems like those of Latin America, corruption associated with the drug trade inevitably reaches high government officials and the criminal justice system. In a decentralized system like that of the United States, corruption focuses on the local level. In Latin America, the trade in illegal drugs is politically destabilizing (2001, 92).

The reality is that the drug culture in Colombia (and all of Latin America) is a severe issue. It is an issue that cannot be ignored for the simple fact that it serves as a catalyst for so many of the other issues plaguing Colombia. It provides financing for guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Efforts to squash the program have left thousands of farmers destitute and vulnerable to the whims of guerrillas and drug traffickers. These issues lead to the displacement of millions of innocent citizens, a phenomenon that has caused thousands more Colombians to join one of the armed causes.

Furthermore, the drug traffickers are responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of judges, police officers, journalists, soldiers and public figures. Some of their most public of victims includes three presidential candidates, an attorney general, a newspaper publisher and a famous comedian (Kline and Gray 2007, 223). Colombian drug traffickers, in addition to their direct contribution to the violence, have also given way to an increase in paramilitary violence. The drug traffickers have employed paramilitaries to guard their ranches from guerrilla violence, using methods of kidnapping and extortion. These drug traffickers also possess a deep hatred for the guerrillas and a loyalty to a goal of land reform, two sentiments shared by other large landowners who have begun to employ paramilitaries. “Drug traffickers thus joined other elites in creating paramilitary groups in positive regions. Before long, some of the trafficker-created paramilitary groups became directly involved in drug trafficking, grew autonomous, and amassed great wealth and power” (Kline and Gray 2007, 223).

U.S. Relations and Intervention

Through the War on Drugs, the United States’ War on Drugs has been the cause of remarkable misfortune in Colombia. It has been the cause of homelessness and despair for hundreds of thousands of Colombian farmers. The U.S. aid, which is in constant competition with the money from drug traffickers, has so far been unable to entice civilians to grow location sanctioned crops. This is simply because it is more profitable for farmers to grow crops for the drug traffickers. Some sources portray that coca brings in three times as much money as those crops sanctioned by the Colombian and United States’ governments (Garcia-Barrio 2001).

Spraying Pesticides

The United States has equipped the Colombian military with helicopters and airplanes in order to spray the coca fields with pesticides, like glyphosate. According to Linda Panetta, director of the School of the Americas Watch/Northeast, “they [Colombian soldiers] spray indiscriminately. In La Hormiga, a exiguous city in the Amazon Territory, the spraying killed medicinal plants and food crops such as yucca. Yet, the adjacent coca fields flourished. Glyphosate seeps into the soil and water. Fish die in contaminated rivers” (Garcia-Barrio 2001). The spraying of pesticides has also contributed to the deaths of cows and other farm animals. It has also caused the illnesses and displacement of many indigenous peoples. Basically, the United States aid has done nothing but undermine the efforts to stabilize the drug problem in Colombia (and in the United States). The program has been woefully ineffective, essentially causing more harm than expedient.

FARC Arrests: Miniscule Success

At the end of March of 2006, the United States indicted about 50 FARC members, charging them with sending twenty-five million dollars worth of cocaine around the world in order to finance their terrorist activities. In addition, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was charged with ordering the killings of farmers that refused to cooperate with the group, the kidnapping and murder of United States citizens as well as the downing of United States planes sent to fumigate the coca crops. Both Colombia and the United States consider this to be a major blow against the organization and hope that this will be the first of many big steps in bringing FARC to its knees (Associated Press “50 Colombia Rebels Indicted on Drug Trafficking Charges” 2006). Despite the fact that both the Colombian and the American governments consider this operation to be a enormous success, the evidence points in another direction.

For one, the arrests were actually a very small success in the War on Drugs. Only 50 of more than 20,000 FARC members were arrested. Perhaps more importantly, the United States’ involvement in this type of activity actually hinders progress.

The Mere Presence

Despite the fact that the United States has provided billions of dollars worth of assistance, it is precisely this type of intervention that prevents the much needed assistance from neighboring Latin American countries. These countries claim that they are unwilling to help because the United States has been so unsuccessful in their efforts against the drug trade domestically. Support from these countries is vital to the success of Plan Colombia, conventional President Bill Clinton’s $1.2 billion dollar plan to “destroy the drug segment of the guerrilla movement, leaving the guerrillas either to wither away or negotiate their plan out” (Kissinger 2001, 91). Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela is determined to work against government efforts, sympathizing with the guerrillas and opposing American presence near its borders (Kissinger 2001, 92). It is the mere presence of United States forces that prevents Colombians and those from neighboring countries to horrified away from lending their assistance to the cause.

This is not to say that it is simply the American policy on drugs that hinders Latin American countries from coming to Colombia’s befriend. It was during the early 1960s that “the United States became increasingly concerned with threats to its dwelling in Latin America. Not only was Fidel Castro maneuvering Cuba into the Soviet orbit, but revolutionary nationalism in a number of countries assumed an increasingly anti-U.S. flavor” (Myers 1988, 277). This anti-American sentiment has only been increasing over the past few decades, even more so in 2006 after the United States asserted its possibility of building a wall between the United States and Mexico, a gesture to which most of the Latin American countries object. In fact, twenty-eight of the thirty-four participating members of the Organization of American States passed a declaration against the United States in October of 2006. The twenty-eight countries argue that the US opinion to build a wall between the United States and Mexico would go against the inter-American spirit of the Organization. The declaration also states that it is not believed that the wall will solve the problems with immigration (“Mexico Gets Support” 2006). Although this issue does not directly involve Colombia, it is indicative of the spirit with which Latin American countries regard the United States.

This gesture alone makes it quite clear that Latin America is not alive to in supporting any action of the United States, including one that would help a neighboring country. The fact that the United States is lending assistance to Colombia almost ensures that its Latin American neighbors will not be lending their assistance as well, which in the eyes of many political scientists, means failure.

Why the Doom and Gloom?

The South American country of Colombia has been continually plagued by violence, insurrection and inequality. It remains one of South America’s most stable democracies and is transitioning to a free market economy. The government has, so far, been unable to win control over distinct regions of the country, leaving landowners’ private armies as the sole source of protection and control in these areas. This, combined with the growing popularity of guerilla organizations, namely the Armed Forces of the Colombian Revolution (FARC) and the Army of National Liberation (ELN), has created a hotbed for instability in Colombia. Furthermore, since the 1970′s drug trafficking has become increasingly approved in certain regions of the country. The lucrative drug trade in Colombia has increased the instability in Colombia by financing paramilitary organizations, making the country one of the leaders in non-political homicides and kidnapping

Despite the fact that Colombia has the potential to become a legitimate and stable democracy, and a beacon of hope for its neighboring countries, it has not been able to bring and ruin to the troubles that hold it back from the necessary stability. Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State and current foreign policy analyst, has quite a pessimistic outlook when it comes to the idea of the Colombian government’s capability to solve these problems. Kissinger has asserted that the problem with Plan Colombia is that too considerable emphasis is placed on the military and that the United States should “do what it can to help build a government there capable of enforcing its own laws against poppy and coca production, against drug processing plants, and against the elaborate transport systems devised to move drugs from Colombia for distribution and consumption in the United States” (2001, 90-91). Kissinger explains that a majority of the $1.2 billion dollar fund for the concept is being utilized toward high-tech attack helicopters and equipment as well as training for Colombian troops by United States’ officers. The military focus of this idea ensures failure.

The small farmers that most often grow and cultivate the drugs should be given more opportunities to grow alternative crops, so that the likelihood of becoming a target of the guerrilla, paramilitary or drug traffickers is decreased. The United States should increase its aid for alternative crop programs rather than military attend because it is the financial desperation of the farmers that makes them so susceptible to falling in line with the demands of the drug producers (Kissinger 2001, 91). Kissinger also asserts that in order for Plan Colombia to succeed, the United States needs to formulate a plan which will combine its modern military efforts with more socially focused aspects of agricultural and judicial reform that will entice Latin American cooperation (Kissinger 2001, 93).

Another reason why the original plan for Colombia will fail is the simple fact that the United States has lent military assistance. This has proven to be cause for Colombia’s neighboring countries to withdraw relieve, especially in the case of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who opposes American presence near Venezuela’s borders. It is also the apprehension of Colombia’s neighbors that will prove to be a hurdle for the success of the current plan. Neighboring countries, like Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, are reluctant to lend assistance to this plan because they fear that in the event of the plan’s success, Colombia’s troubles might simply shift over the borders into their countries (Kissinger 2001, 92).

The situation described has amounted to what is known as a Catch-22. Colombia cannot combat its own internal conflicts without American assistance. Nor, however, can Colombia succeed against its conflicting armed forces without the assistance of other Latin American countries. The worry is that its neighboring Latin American countries are unwilling to cooperate with the United States, which leaves the Colombian government in quite a spot. Because Colombia needs the assistance of both the United States and the other Latin American nations, it seems highly unlikely that any conception will enact successfully.

The most disturbing fact stemming from the conflicts between the guerrilla groups, the paramilitary groups and the government forces is that the victims are most often innocent civilians. “The principal victims of the conflict, as always, are the rural Colombians caught in the crossfire. Like their predecessors in times past, millions have fled to urban shantytowns and neighboring countries. And in one of Colombia’s longstanding and painful ironies, from the ranks of the children displaced by the violence, new belligerents will be recruited to fight on all sides” (Kline and Gray 2007, 225).

Colombia’s troubles are a cycle, a result of a deeply rooted tradition combined with novel programs and ideologies. It is obvious that the institution of an authoritarian government or military dictatorship would not solve the problem, as this would give rise to even more violent guerrilla groups. The shift to a capitalized and democratized society has also proven unsuccessful, with the current troubles in Colombia standing as solid evidence. Because the roots of these troubles date back to the times of colonization, it seems that there is simply no solution for Colombia’s situation. Everything about Colombia’s makeup seems to have combined to make a hotbed for unrest and insurrection. The geography, the demographics, its Iberian culture, as well as its history and political development all play a role in the current conflicts that are plaguing stability in Colombia.

Perhaps the acknowledge lies in the rich Iberian tradition left behind from explorers of past centuries. The doom and gloom comes from the fact that the Iberians, upon conquering new land in the Americas, created within Spanish-speaking countries a fatalistic society which a permanent underclass of native Americans (Porter 2006). It is both the fatalistic mindset and the built in lower class that has created this unbreakable mold of instability and unrest for Colombia. It is also clear that Colombia’s tradition of violence is the cause for many of the issues now troubling the country. Already, more than seventy percent of Colombia’s population lives in only ten cities (Embassy of Colombia 2003). As the frequency and intensity of the violence increases in the countryside, millions more will flee into the urban areas. This will cause an even more unbearable strain on the urban resources.

Kissinger’s final assessment of the situation in Colombia is stated quite clearly: “At some point it may conclude that it [the government] has no alternative but to negotiate an agreement with the guerrillas that will become the final step on the road to losing control altogether. And the impact of such a collapse and the emergence of a radical government financed by drug money would show devastating to other countries in the position” (Kissinger 2001, 93). After reviewing Colombia’s history and modern situation, being pulled in different directions by guerrilla forces, drug traffickers, paramilitary forces, the United States government and the leaders of the neighboring governments, it has become clear that despite the fatalistic tone of Kissinger’s prediction, he is most likely correct in his assumptions for the future of Colombia. The troubles created by a combination of the deeply rooted tradition of violence and the current socio-political strife are most likely insurmountable. It is a volatile combination of Colombia’s past and current problems that have created a situation that, at this point, has no apparent solution.
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